05 August 2010

Frank Press, President of the NAS, 1989 on Climate Policy

The essay that I excerpted at length in the previous post was written in 1989 by Frank Press, President of the US National Academy of Sciences (1981-1993) and former science advisor to President Jimmy Carter (1977-1980).  There he is above shaking hands with President Obama.  It was published in the Fall, 1989 issue of EarthQuest, newsletter of the Office for Interdisciplinary Earth Studies at UCAR. I find the essay interesting for several reasons.

First, the tone and deference to policy makers sounds like it is from another era.  Press clearly distinguishes the evaluation of science from the challenge of decision making, and advice from advocacy.  Since Press' time, on the climate issue the NAS has become much more advocacy focused with respect to climate, issuing statements such as (PDF):
It is essential that world leaders agree on the emission reductions needed to combat negative consequences of anthropogenic climate change at the UNFCCC negotiations in Copenhagen in December 2009.
I find it notable that most of today's leading climate scientists visible in the political debate have zero experience in actual policy positions.  The president of the NAS today is Ralph Cicerone, a very well respected scientist, who went directly from academia to the NAS.  Press took a very different route to the NAS.  Today, many climate scientists feel comfortable lecturing on policy and politics with neither experience nor expertise -- and it shows.  Also, Press was not a climate scientist, but a geophysicist, which meant that he had some professional distance from the field.  At the time no one complained that his expertise disqualified him from rendering judgments on the science.

When I interviewed Press as part of our science advisors series in 2006 he related an interesting story about the perils of advocacy and credibility.  Here is how I summarized it then:
[T]he Academy, during his tenure, never saw fit to undertake a study on Ronald Reagan’s proposed Strategic Defense Initiative (or “Star Wars”). Dr. Press’ response was interesting. He said that there was a petition circulating among the scientific community expressing opposition to the program and that something like 60% of the members of the Academy had signed the position. Dr. Press suggested that this had compromised the ability of the Academy to lend an independent voice to the debate and that any report that the Academy did would therefore be dismissed in the political process. It seems to me that the nation would have benefited from such an independent review by the Academy on this issue.
Press saw clearly that overt advocacy (rightly or wrongly)  tended to delegitmize efforts to offer independent advice on science and policy.  Today's scientific leaders in the climate community appear to have forgotten such lessons, with only a few exceptions.

Second, the summary of climate science offered by Press offered a description of the state of the science that would remain accurate and compelling today -- with one exception (discussed below).  His assessment of the technological challenge was prescient:
Substantial reduction of CO2, which is responsible for half of the temperature rise, will require a change in the energy economy of the world at a cost of hundreds of billions to trillions of dollars and may not be technically possible over the next 40 years.
He was right.  In fact, such a statement might still be right.  Press' discussion of costs, after being scaled up for inflation and the fact that he was discussing them at the national level were also prescient.

The one comment that he made about science that would likely not stand up today was on sea level rise:
Sea level is likely to rise by one meter beyond 2050.
As I have documented, sea level rise predictions were much higher at this time than they are today (a little know past of the climate debate).  While Press says "beyond 2050" (which could mean anything, really) more than 20 years after his prediction, the world remains a long way from a one meter sea level rise.  Consider that in the twenty years since Press wrote that piece global sea level has risen by about 6 centimeters.  That is a long way from 100 centimeters, and implies an average sea level rise of about 24 mm per year to 2050 to get to 1 meter.  One meter by 2050 does not seem very realistic, based on trends in the past two decades.  It is not surprising that climate scientists no longer offer predictions for sea level rise to 2050, preferring instead to discuss 2100 and beyond.

Third, Press' policy recommendations-- which were not favored by the climate science or advocacy communities -- offer a glimpse into an alternate universe.  We can only speculate as to what would have happened if the world had adopted an approach recommended by Press, focused on taking first steps on a wide range of issues that can be justified on a basis broader than just CO2.  Arguably, we'd be much further along in decarbonization and adaptation, and science would be less politicized.  I can dream anyway!

It is only now, several decades later, that the world is actually finding the wisdom in approaches like those recommended by Press, as top-down regulation has failed repeatedly, most visbly in Copenhagen in 2009 and in the US in 2010.  And yet, the insanity of climate policy means that many will try and try again.

When future historians look back on climate policy of the late 20th and early 21st centuries, they will find that the failure to act with effect occurred not due to a lack of good ideas.  Rather, good ideas were systematically disfavored in the political process in favor of options that were doomed to fail.  Regrettably, we have not yet fully emerged from that situation, but there are signs of progress.  There are lessons yet to be learned from our recent history that might help improve policy making.

13 comments:

Sylvain said...

I had no chance to find out who it was. Never heard of him before.

On the other hand, I'm currently preparing for my fall session and I'm reading the book "Science a 4000 year history" by Patricia Fara, which I highly recommend, and I find interesting that science has almost always been highly politicize and that the debate have rarely been civilized. Dispute in science are usually resolved by the dying out of the proponent, although it is not always the one who was right that end up vindicated, at least at first.

She gives the example of Laplace who "seeking preeminence and fast result, Laplace dominated his own colleagues manipulated scientific committees to promote his disciple, and took advantage of France's administrative centralization to ensure that his doctrine were perpetuated in textbooks and examination syllabuses."

I find this example to be very similar to what happened in climate science over the last 20-30 years.

j ferguson said...

I apologize for the simplicity of this comment, but...

Experience with policy making must mean experience with chance-taking - adopting (not just advocating) a course of action with possibly insufficient information either available or understood.

Although no-one can live without chance-taking, the scope in which most people do this is relatively small.

Can I suggest that this is not an activity that scientists would or should have much experience with, at least on the broad scale of being responsible for policies affecting thousands of lives?

I'm not comfortable promoting a class of premier second-guessers (nothing wrong with that) to First-Guesser.

That the current fright is largely a scientific one, shouldn't be a reason to give scientists direct access to the controls.

They should certainly be seen AND heard, and at length and in detail, but no, they shouldn't drive.

bernie said...

Roger:
This is an excellent illustration of clear thinking about the role of scientists in the policy formulating process. It is probably harder to find such examples today because of the pervasive comingling of solution stakeholders with those responsible for making decisions. Comingling is a bad practice in finance and a bad practice in policy making.

I have always liked March and Olsen's notion of the "Garbage Can Model of Decision Making" as a cautionary description of how complex, ambiguous and potentially polarizing decisions get made.

Sharon F. said...

Roger:

You said "Press took a very different route." It looks pretty academic to me. What am I missing?

Roger Pielke, Jr. said...

-4-Sharon

Science Advisor to the President

Sharon F. said...

ahh. you mean a different route to becoming head of NAS.
Still, I don't think the President's Science Advisor is a real down-to-earth kind of policy position. But that's probably another discussion.

Roger Pielke, Jr. said...

-6-Sharon

Yes, to NAS.

And agreed about the Science Advisor, however, it is clear that every one of them that I interviewed had a pretty sophisticated understanding of policy and politics.

Howard said...

"[C]limate scientists no longer offer predictions for sea level rise to 2050, preferring instead to discuss 2100 and beyond."

It seems to me that you're implying that longer horizons are preferred because predictions further in the future are less easily falsified or perceived to be unlikely. Is that an accurate characterization?

Roger Pielke, Jr. said...

-8-Howard

I do not know why the scientific community has moved away from decadal predictions of sea level rise. But it is true that the longer into the future a prediction is made the less the chance for evaluation against real-world data.

I have before called for 10 year predictions of sea level rise, and I still think it a good idea.

Matt said...

-8-Howard,
As another explanation, I'd add that as Roger pointed out, current rates are much slower than those large predictions, so a longer time frame means (even if you use current rates) larger overall predictions. Which may sound a lot better, even if it's the same relatively low rate.

Roger, I think the SDI anecdote is perhaps the clearest and best argument I've heard regarding "honest broker"-ish things.

Howard said...

-9-Roger,
Thanks for the clarification. I read earlier your call for more definite predictions in your 2008 Nature Geoscience letter. Has there been any response to that letter?

-10-Matt,
I had considered that explanation, along the lines of Schneider's "scary scenarios." But I certainly didn't want to put any such words into Roger's mouth.

My own pet explanation is twofold. From the IPCC's perspective, a failed short-term prediction will decrease confidence in climate science reliability (as a whole) far more than a correct short-term prediction will increase it. And short-term predictions can be fundamentally correct but swamped by natural variable factors such as volcanoes. So in that regard, it is rational for the IPCC to avoid playing in that sandbox.

From an individual scientist's perspective, by avoiding shorter-term predictions, the scientists avoid getting involved in more public discussions of whether observations bear out (or fail to bear out) their predictions. It allows them to focus within the community on the reconciliation of models with observations.

Warning: the above are purest speculation, based on no facts, and should be taken with large doses of NaCl. Or KCl if you have a problem with sodium.

eric144 said...

Excellent blog Roger, very lucid.It must be worth creating at least a lecture out of it.

I think your fundamental approach of investing in research is sound, particularly in new energy creation technologies. I just don't think the powers that be are interested at present.

The long term goal must be not only sustainability but a human / nature symbiosis.

(Having a brief respite from cynicism.)

eric144 said...

"Press saw clearly that overt advocacy (rightly or wrongly) tended to delegitmize efforts to offer independent advice on science and policy"

Yes, it is frighteningly counter productive in the political and public (media) arenas. I don't think Hansen / Schmidt (for example) understand the impression they are giving of being cheer leaders, and therefore completely unscientific. Romm is behaving somewhat like the Rush Limbaugh of catastrophe. Not a great tactic for NYT readers, I wouldn't have thought.

In Britain, the BBC's manipulative alarmism has given rise to a backlash. You covered an advertisement on this blog aimed at children, which was so excessive it was comical.

Overall, the tactics convey a distinct air of desperation, which may well be the reality when one considers Copenhagen and the premature death of the US climate bill

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